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Rice: United States v. Varig: Can King Only Do Little Wrongs?

United States v. Varig: Can the King Only Do

Little Wrongs?
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) [hereinafter referred to as Varig],' the federal courts inconsistently applied
the Federal Torts Claims Act 2 discretionary function exception 3 in
actions against the United States based upon Federal Aviation Administration negligence. 4 The courts were unable to develop and
apply a consistent standard as to what was or was not a discretionary function.5 Therefore, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 to hear the Varig7 and United Scottish8 cases, the legal
community anticipated that the Supreme Court, through the facts
of these two cases, would resolve the previous inconsistencies of the
lower courts and establish clear guidelines for future application of
the discretionary function exception. 9 However, the Supreme Court
not only failed to seize a "unique opportunity to fme-tune the scope
of the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act" 10 but, by treating the facts of the two consolidated cases as the
1. 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984), rev'g, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) and 692 F.2d 1209
(9th Cir. 1982). United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Varig], and United States
v. United Scottish Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as United
Scottish], were consolidated by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's decision will
be referred to and cited as Varig.
2. The Federal Torts Claim Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-24, 60 Stat. 842
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12,
2671-80 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as FTCA].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). See infra notes 9 and 15.
4. Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 600 F.2d
590 (6th Cir. 1979) (FAA had no discretion to ignore its own regulations; however,
dismissed for failure to prove proximate cause); Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacated by agreement, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975) (held
that a cause of action exists against Federal Aviation Administration [hereinafter cited
as FAA], for negligent inspection and certification); Takacs v. Jump Shack, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (held negligent inspection by FAA of parachute packing
barred by discretionary function exception).
5. See cases cited supra note 4.
6. Varig, 103 S.Ct. 2084 (1983). See supra note 1.
7. 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984). See supra note 1.
8. 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984). See supra note 1.
9. For an excellent discussion see Comment, Discretion and the FAA: An Overview
of the Applicability of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the FederalTort Claims
Act to FAA Activity, 49 3. AIR. L. & CoM. 143, 172 (1983).
10. Petition for Rehearing at 5, United Scottish, 105 S.Ct. 26 (1984), denying reh'g
to 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984), rev'g 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
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same (when in fact they were vastly different),1 1 the unanimous
opinion of the Court has also had the unfortunate result of further

confusing the discretionary function's
application to negligent in12
spection by federal agencies.
This Note will discuss the Federal Tort Claims Act [hereinafter

referred to as FTCA], 13 the discretionary function exception and
the two leading Supreme Court cases prior to Varig. It will then
provide an overview of pre-Varig decisions applicable to the negligent certification of aircraft. Next, the Note will briefly explain the
Federal Aviation Administration [hereinafter referred to as FAA]
certification process, before presenting the facts relating to the certification in the Varig and United Scottish cases. The Note will then
analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Varig, address the
problems created through the Court's misuse of the facts, and provide a criticism of the Court's decision. The Note concludes by suggesting an approach to determining the application of the
discretionary function after Varig, reviewing recent lower court decisions applying the Varig holding, and suggesting methods of distinguishing the Varig facts from future FAA negligent certification
cases.
I.

THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

The FrCA1 4 was enacted as a limited waiver of the United
States' sovereign immunity from suit for certain types of specified
torts committed by federal agencies through its employees.15 An
Petition for Rehearing] (Petition for Rehearing on file in the offices of the California
Western Law Review).
11. See infra notes 98-168 and accompanying text.
12. 3 L. ALERT 305, 311 (July 23, 1984).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1982).
See also supra note 2.
14. Id.
15. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953). By examining the torts
which Congress excluded from coverage under the FTCA, one may reasonably infer
that any other tort and its facts may be brought under the Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-79
(1982). 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) generally excludes: a) claims of negligence against
federal agencies and employees exercising discretion in the execution of their work (typically at the planning level); b) claims arising out of the negligent handling of letters or
postal matters; c) claims against customs officers regarding duties or tax and the detention of property; d) claims in admiralty against the United States; e) claims of negligence against government employees regarding war and national defense under sections
1-31 of Title 50 of the U.S.C.; g) repealed; h) claims against United States' employees
for intentional torts such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, misrepresentation and deceit; i) claims for damages caused by treasury fiscal operations or by monetary system regulations; j) claims against the government arising out
of the combatant activities of the military during time of war; k) claims arising in a
foreign country; 1) claims arising from activities of the Tenn. Valley Authority;
m) claims arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company; and n) claims
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individual asserting a claim against the United States for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees must proceed under the provisions outlined in the FTCA. 16 For example, the FTCA first

requires the claimant to exhaust administrative remedies within the
federal agency which is alleged to be negligent.' 7 If the government
fails to settle the plaintiffs claim and suit is then brought, the district courts may award damages against the United States only
when a private individual could be held liable in like circumstances
under the relevant state law. 8 However, when Congress enacted
the FTCA, it excluded certain claims from the Act's coverage 19 out
of fear that those claims would inhibit the government's
20

functioning.

The exception that is pertinent to this Note is the discretionary

function exception. 2 ' This exception provides that the FTCA shall
not apply to "[a]ny claim. . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionaryfunction or
arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or
a bank for cooperatives.
16. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1982). Section 2675(a) provides in pertinent part:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for
money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal
agency and his dliam shall have been finally denied by the agency in
writing ....
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982). See also Genson v. Ripley, 681 F.2d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.
1982); Three-M Enter., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1977); Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 2, 5-12 (1962); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 63-65 (1955). The FTCA gives district courts:
[The] exclusive jurisdiction on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982). See supra note 15 for a general summary of those
claims Congress excluded from coverage under the FTCA.
20. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 28-30, 32 (1953). The Court stated that while Congress
desired to waive government immunity for some of its employees tortious acts, "it was
not contemplated that the Government should be subject to liability arising from acts of
a governmental nature or function." Id. at 28.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) excludes the following claims for FTCA coverage:
Any claim based upon an act of omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.
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duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern'2 2
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
What constitutes a discretionary function is not defined within
the FTCA. 2 3 The legislative history of the FTCA provides only one
paragraph relating to the intent of Congress in passing the discretionary function exception. 24 The intent was to insulate legislative
and regulatory decisions from review by the judiciary through damage suits in tort. 25 However, the legislative history also indicates
that the common-law torts of all
federal employees would be subject
26
to a tort claim under the Act.
Prior to Varig, the two leading Supreme Court cases interpreting
the discretionary function exception were Dalehite v. United
States 27 and Indian Towing Co. v. United States.28 In Dalehite, the
government developed and implemented a plan to produce fertilizer
for war-ravaged Europe and the Orient.29 The particular fertilizer
had been stored in large quantities in Texas City, Texas, prior to
being loaded onto a steamship for shipment overseas.3 0 Prior to
departure, the fertilizer caught fire and the ship exploded. 31 The
United States was sued for damages resulting from the explosion of
this fertilizer, which leveled most of the city and killed numerous
32
people.
The negligence alleged by the plaintiffs was that the government
shipped or permitted to be shipped into a populated area, without
33
adequate investigation or warnings, a highly explosive fertilizer.
The Supreme Court, after a thorough review of the FTCA's legislative history, 34 held that the United States was not liable for damages
as a result of negligence in the fertilizer program. 35 The Court commented that "[w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable."' 36 Additionally, the Court stated that the decisions held culpable in Dalehite
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945).
Id.; see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 33.
Id.; see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-35.
346 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 924 (1953).
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
346 U.S. at 19-22.
Id. at 22.

31. Id. at23.
32. Id.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 24-31.
35. Id. at 42.
36. Id. at 36.
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were all responsibly made at the planning level and, therefore, not
to
actionable, rather than at the operational level which, according
37
FTCA.
the
under
actionable
been
have
would
the Court,
The difficulty in establishing a test for what was a planning level
decision and what was an operational level decision was apparent in
the conflict between the Dalehite majority opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson.3 8 The majority held that no liability
existed for the entire operation, right down to the negligent mislabeling of the bags of fertilizer. 39 In his dissent, Justice Jackson
agreed with the planning level/operational level test, but found that
only the initial decision to implement the fertilizer program should
have been considered a discretionary function, and not the negligent
acts of those responsible for carrying out the details. 4°
Three years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court decided Indian
Towing v. United States.4 1 In that case, the plaintiff suffered economic loss when his tugboat and barge ran aground, resulting in the
destruction of the cargo. 42 The Coast Guard's failure to properly
of its inoperation was
maintain the lighthouse or to warn seamen
43
the acknowledged cause of the accident.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause the case
presented an important aspect of the still undetermined extent of
44
the Government's liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act."
The relevant provisions of the FTCA that the Court wished to review were: (1) section 1346(b), which provides that the liability of
the United States is in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred; 45 (2) section 2674, which states that
the United States shall be liable in the same manner and extent as a
private individual under like circumstances; 46 and, (3) section
2680(a), the discretionary function exception. 4 7
In Indian Towing, the government conceded that the operation of
the lighthouse was at the "operational level" and, therefore, that the
discretionary function exception did not apply.4 8 However, the
government argued that the operation of the lighthouse was a
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 36-42, 47-60.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 58.
350 U.S. 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63, 70.
Id. at 63.
Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), supra note 18.
350 U.S. at 63. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982), which provides that

"the United States shall be liable... in the same manner and to the same extent as a

private individual under like circumstances ..

"

47. 350 U.S. at 63-64. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), supra note 21.
48. 350 U.S. at 64.
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uniquely governmental function and, as such, the government could
not be held liable" 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances,'" as provided by sec49
tion 2674.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument by stating that "the
statutory language is 'under like circumstances,' and that it is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger
and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan'
task in a careful manner." 50 The Court commented further that
"[t]he broad and just purpose which the statute was designed to

effect was to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of
governmental activities in circumstances
like unto those in which a
's
private person would be liable."'
While a uniform test or a consistent application of the "planning
level/operational level" distinction has never been established, the
concession by the government that the operations of the lighthouse
were "operational level" decisions, and the Court's agreement with
this concession, have been an aid to the lower courts in applying the
test to determine the scope of the discretionary function
52

exception.
II.

PRE-VARIG CASES INVOLVING NEGLIGENT CERTIFICATION
BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

Prior to the Varig decision, the United States Supreme Court had
not addressed the discretionary function exception as applied to
negligent certification of aircraft by the FAA. 5 3 A review of several
49. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 64-65 (emphasis added). The "Good Samaritan" requirements of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) provide that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
51. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 68.
52.
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once
it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use
due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order. . . or
give warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty
and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable
under the Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
53. 191 U.S. 1 (1903), et seq.
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of the lower court cases that considered this issue illustrates the
inconsistent interpretation of the planning level/operational level
test when applied to cases involving negligent certification and the
discretionary function exception.
In Gibbs v. United States,54 plaintiffs alleged that the FAA negligently approved and certified as airworthy Twin Beach aircraft
N2999, which crashed on take-off when, in fact, the aircraft as
modified was not airworthy.5 5 Plaintiffs contended that this negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and that the United
States was liable under the FTCA.5 6 In addressing this claim, the
district court noted that, "[h]aving decided to enter the broad field
of the regulation of the flight and repair and modifications of aircraft and licensing of pilots, the Government becomes responsible
for the care with which those activities are conducted. ' 57 Further,
the court noted, "[a]s to the. . . airworthiness of aircraft N2999 as
modified, the Court cannot say that it [the FAA] discharged its
duty of care. . . . "58 The court was "impressed" that there was
laxity in the manner in which the authorized inspector returned the
aircraft to service without checking the modifications. 5 9 However,
the court never applied the planning level/operational level test nor
decided whether the government could be liable for negligent certification, because it found that the evidence failed to show that the
6°
government's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
In Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,61 an Eastern Lockheed Electra
encountered a flock of starlings on takeoff from Boston. The birds
were ingested into the engines, which then failed, thus causing the
plane to crash. 62 Prior to the accident, in the certification process
of the engines, the FAA required the manufacturer to conduct a
"chicken test."'63 The tests were ordered for the purposes of determining the effects of bird ingestion on the engines. 64 The test
showed that the engines' intakes were capable of ingesting birds and
that such ingestion could cause a permanent loss of power in some
54. 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
55. Id. at 394.
56. Id. at 400.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 401. "The court is of the opinion and finds that the error of the pilot in
overloading the craft and positioning its load so that its center of gravity was moved
rearwardly beyond the safety point was the proximate cause of this tragic crash." Id. at
400-01 (referring to Bristow v. United States, 390 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1962)).
61. 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
62. Id. at 675.
63. Id. at 676. The so-called chicken test is a test required by the FAA for engine
certification wherein four-pound chicken carcasses are fired at high speed into an operating engine to simulate bird ingestion.
64. Id.
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circumstances. 65 Notwithstanding this knowledge, the FAA certified the engines as airworthy without any warnings or limitations
on the operation of the66 aircraft around airports where birds were
known to be a hazard.
In Rapp, the district court never discussed a planning level/operational level distinction, but concluded that the negligence of the
government was the proximate cause of the accident and thus found
the government liable for damages. 67 However, while on appeal,
the government settled the case with a requirement that the opinion
be vacated.6 8 As a result, commentators have noted that "while
Rapp is of limited value as authority for the proposition that the
government has a duty to inspect in a non-negligent fashion, the
government was sufficiently concerned about the issue to settle the
case pending appeal and to insist upon an order vacating the judg'69
ment below."
The government's liability for negligent inspection of an aircraft
by an employee or authorized inspector of the FAA was also dis70
cussed in In re Air Crash DisasterNear Silver Plume, Colorado.
The suit arose from the crash of a Martin 404 aircraft that had
recently been certified as airworthy by an authorized inspector.
The inspector neglected to inspect the condition of the seat belts,
which failed on impact with the ground. 7 1 The court, in a lengthy
discussion of the FTCA, stated that where an employee of the FAA
fails to perform an "operational duty" such as the required inspection of seat belts, the government can be held liable for the injuries
that result from this negligence. 72 However, the court found that
the negligence alleged in this case was not the proximate cause of
73
the air crash.
Contrary to the opinions which imply that the government may
be held liable for negligent certification, is the decision in Garbarino
v. United States.74 In Garbarino,plaintiffs asserted that the FAA
was negligent for not enacting stricter safety and inspection stan65. Id. at 678.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 680.
68. 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970). A vacated opinion is one in which the judgment
and holding of the court has been cancelled or rescinded and, therefore, is without any
value as a legal precedent for other courts to follow.
69. Krause & Cook, The Liability of the United Statesfor Negligent Inspection1983, 48 J.AIR. L. & COM. 725, 737 (1983).
70. 445 F. Supp. 384, 400-401 (D.Kan. 1977).
71. Id. at 405-09.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 410. The proximate cause of the accident appeared to be pilot error in
allowing the aircraft to be flown at an unreasonably low altitude, although the court did
not state what it felt was the proximate cause.
74. 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981).
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dards. 75 Plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was negligent in failing to
test and inspect the aircraft type for crashworthiness and design, in
particular, the fuel tank assembly and fuel line system. 76 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of
the United States, 77 holding that the failure to enact stricter stanexdards was planning level activity covered by the discretionary
78
ception. It thus barred any claim against the government
In Takacs v. Jump Shack, Inc. ,79 the acting fiduciary of the estate
of a parachutist, who was killed when his parachute failed to open,
brought an action against the United States under the FTCA.8 0
The suit alleged that the FAA was negligent in the inspection and
certification of the parachute design and manufacture. 8 1 The court
granted the FAA's motion for summary judgment on the basis that
both causes of action were barred by the discretionary function exception. 82 The court first noted that the FAA's issuance of a certificate approving the design and manufacture of the parachute
involved balancing a myriad of factors. It then concluded that
valid defense if
"[t]he discretionary function exception affords a '83
there is room for policy judgment and discretion.
Finally, in George v. United States,84 plaintiffs alleged that the
sole proximate cause of a crash was a defective fuel system, which
was brought about by the corrosion of a brass and steel fuel pick-up
component. 85 Plaintiffs contended that the certification of an aircraft with a brass and steel fuel pick-up was a violation of FAA
standards. 86 The lower court found that "the plaintiffs' claim
amounted to no more than a complaint that the government failed
to promulgate regulations banning the use of coterminous, dissimilar metals in the fuel pick-up."'87 Consequently, the appellate court
concluded that this was a planning level decision and, thus, held
75. Id. at 1063.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1063, 1066.
78. Id. at 1065. "Deciding what those standards are to be and whether such standards are to include crashworthiness criteria, is the type of policy decision that falls
squarely within the discretionary function exception. Id.
79. 546 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 77.
82. Id. at 79.
83. Id. at 78 (citing Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 406 U.S. 797, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1971)).
84. 703 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 90.
86. Id. at 91.
87. Id. Plaintiffs alleged the commingling of two dissimilar metals, in an environment subject to moisture retention, rendered the fuel pick-up particularly susceptible to
rust and was thus a forseeable hazard. The court found this contention not borne out
by the record, which, to the contrary, indicated that the brass and steel fuel pick-up had
been used for thirty years without problems. Id. at 90-92.
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that the district court properly determined that appellants' claim
fell squarely within the bar of the discretionary function
88
exception.
These cases left the distinction between a planning level and an
operational level decision very uncertain. Further, the cases failed
to provide the courts with adequate guidance as to precisely which
FAA certification activities were within the scope of the discretionary function exception and which activities were not within the
scope.
III.

THE VARIG AND UNITED SCOTTISH CASE

A.

Certification of Aircraft by the FederalAviation
Administration
The Federal Aviation Act of 195889 established a duty on the
part of the administrator of the FAA to prescribe minimum safety
standards "governing the design, materials, workmanship, construction and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required in the interest of safety." 90 Specific
requirements for the procedure and duties in the certification process are set forth in the Federal Aviation Regulations. 91 Depending
upon the manufacturer, type of certificate requested, and aircraft
system or design under review, the regulations require either drawings and specifications, spot checks, or actualphysical inspection of
92
the installed system before any certificate will be issued.
In certifying new aircraft for safe flight, the FAA uses a multistep process. 93 Before building a new airplane, a manufacturer
must first submit design drawings and specifications to the FAA to
obtain a type certificate. 94 Next, the manufacturer must build a
prototype and demonstrate an ability to establish conformity of pro88. Id. at 92.
89. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
90. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1982) states:
(a) Minimum standards; rules and regulations
The Secretary of Transportion is empowered and it shall be his duty to
promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing and
revising from time to time:
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design, materials, workmanship, construction, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propel-

lers as may be required in the interest of safety.
91. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-621 (1985).
92. Id.
93. Dombroff, Certification and Inspection: An Overview of Government Liability,

47 J. AIR. L. & COMM. 229, 231 (1982).
94. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1982) provides:
(a) Authorization to issue; application; investigation; tests; issuance of type
certificate
(1) The Secretary of Transportation is empowered to issue type certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers; to specify in regulations the
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duction models with the prototype to obtain a production certificate. 95 Each of the aircraft produced thereafter must be inspected
for conformity to the prototype and safety before an airworthiness
certificate can be issued. 96 An aircraft cannot be operated legally in
the United States without a current and valid type and airworthiappliances for which the issuance of type certificates is reasonably required in
the interest of safety; and to issue such certificates for appliances so specified.
(2) Any interested person may fie with the Secretary of Transportation an
application for a type certificate for an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or
appliance specified in regulations under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
Upon receipt of an application, the Secretary of Transportation shall make an
investigation thereof and may hold hearings thereon. The Secretary of Transportation shall make, or require the applicant to make, such tests during manufacture and upon completion as the Secretary of Transportation deems
reasonably necessary in the interest of safety, including flight tests and tests of
raw materials or any part or appurtenance of such aircraft, aircraft engine,
propeller, or appliance. If the Secretary of Transportation finds that such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is of proper design, material,
specification, construction, and performance for safe operation, and meets the
minimum standards, rules, and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Transportation, he shall issue a type certificate therefor. The Secretary of
Transportation may prescribe in any such certificate the duration thereof and
such other terms, conditions, and limitations as are required in the interest of
safety. The Secretary of Transportation may record upon any certificate issued for aircraft, aircraft engines, or propellers, a numerical determination of
all of the essential factors relative to the performance of the aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller for which the certificate is issued.
95. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1982) provides:
(b) Production certificates
Upon application, and if it satisfactorily appears to the Secretary of Transportation that duplicates of any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance for which a type certificate has been issued will conform to such
certificate, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue a production certificate
authorizing the production of duplicates of such aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances. The Secretary of Transportation shall make such inspection and may require such tests of any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller,
or appliance manufactured under a production certificate as may be necessary
to assure manufacture of each unit in conformity with the type certificate or
any amendment or modification thereof. The Secretary of Transportation
may prescribe in any such production certificate the duration thereof and such
other terms, conditions, and limitation as are required in the interest of safety.
96. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1982) states as follows:
(c) Airworthiness certificates
The registered owner of any aircraft may file with the Secretary of Transportation an application for an airworthiness certificate for such aircraft. If
the Secretary of Transportation finds that the aircraft conforms to the type
certificate therefor, and, after inspection, that the aircraft is in condition for
safe operation, he shall issue an airworthiness certificate. The Secretary of
Transportation may prescribe in such certificate the duration of such certificate, the type of service for which the aircraft may be used, and such other
terms, conditions, and limitations, as are required in the interest of safety.
Each such certificate shall be registered by the Secretary of Transportion and
shall set forth such information as the Secretary of Transportation may deem
advisable. The certificate number, or such other individual designation as
may be required by the Secretary of Transportation, shall be displayed upon
each aircraft in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Transportation.
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ness certificate. 9 7
The issue in the Varig case was the liability for the negligent inspection conducted under a "spot check" program prior to issuance
of the airworthiness certificate. 98 Because of the nature and com-

plexity of certifying a commercial aircraft, the FAA accomplishes
its inspections by a "spot check" program whereby the inspectors

randomly inspect only a percentage of the aircraft for conformity
with the regulations. 99
Should a design change be required in an existing aircraft, the
party desiring the change is required to obtain a supplemental type
certificate. 0 Obtaining a supplemental type certificate generally involves either submitting drawings and other details to the FAA or

an actual physical inspection by an inspector.10 1 The critical fact of

the United Scottish case is that, since only two aircraft were involved, the regulations permitted less pre-installation documentation provided that an FAA inspector examined and approved the
completed installation before a supplemental type certificate was
02
issued.1
B.

The Facts and Treatment of the Cases by the Lower Courts

This case was the consolidation of two Ninth Circuit cases, yarig
v. United States10 3 and United Scottish v. United States,l04 by the
97. 49 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(1) (1982) provides:

(a) It shall be unlawful(I) For any person to operate in air commerce any civil aircraft for which
there is not currently in effect an airworthiness certificate, or in violation of
the terms of any such certificate ...
98. Varig, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
99. A spot check program is the only practical way the FAA can enforce its air
safety regulations. One major manufacturer of commercial aircraft estimated that in
the course of obtaining a type certificate for a new wide-body aircraft it would submit to
the FAA approximately 300,000 engineering drawings and changes; 2,000 engineering
reports, and 200 other reports. In addition, it would subject the aircraft to about 80
major ground tests and 1,600 hours of flight tests. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMIrrEE OF FAA AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES IMPROVING
AIRCRAFT SAFETY 29 (1980).
100. 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1985) provides:
Any person who alters a product by introducing a major change in type design, not
great enough to require a new application for a type certificate under § 21.19, shall
apply to the Administrator for a supplemental type certificate, except that the holder of
a type certificate for the product may apply for amendment of the original type certificate. The application must be made in a form and manner prescribed by the
Administrator.
101. Brief for Respondents' at 5, Varig, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) (copy on file in the
offices of California Western Law Review).
102. FAA, ORDER TYPE CERTIFICATION MANUAL 31, 32 (Reprint 1967) (requiring a physical inspection of the "prototype modification" if compliance cannot be determined adequately from an evaluation of the technical data).
103. Varig, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984). The primary focus of this Note is the facts of United Scottish and the Supreme Court's opinion
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United States Supreme Court.1 05 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit
found the government liable for the negligent inspection of each aircraft and found liability was not barred by the discretionary func10 6
tion exception of the FTCA.
In Varig, the plaintiffs contended that the FAA was negligent in
certifying the Boeing 707 lavatory units as complying with FAA
fire protection standards.'0 7 The standards specifically required
"waste receptacles to be made of fire-resistant material and to incorporate covers or other provisions for containing possible fires."' 0 8
On July 11, 1973, a Boeing 707 operated by Varig Airlines caught
fire in the aft lavatory waste receptacle. 10 9 Within four to six minutes, thick black smoke filled the cabin and cockpit.1 10 Although
the pilots were able to make a successful crash landing in a farm
field, 124 of 135 people aboard died of asphyxiation from toxic
gases.'
Post-accident investigation revealed that the lavatory,
manufactured by Boeing and inspected by the FAA, lacked a cover
and had large holes, which made the compartment incapable of
2
containing smoke or fire."
The district court granted summary judgment for the United
States on the ground that California law did not recognize an actionable tort duty for inspection and certification activities. 113 "The
district court also found that, even if plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action in tort, recovery against the United States was barred by the
4
discretionary function exception [to the FTCA].""
The Ninth Circuit reversed," 5 first holding that the government
should be liable for negligent inspection under the California "Good
Samaritan" rule." 6 Next, the court rejected the government's reliance on the discretionary function exception, reasoning that inspections of aircraft for compliance with FAA safety regulations are
factual investigations not involving policy choices." 7 The court
in relation to that case. However, the Supreme Court's opinion only makes sense in
relation to the facts of the Vafig case.
104. United Scottish, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
105. 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983). See also supra note 1.
106. Varig, 692 F.2d 1205, 1208-09; United Scottish, 692 F.2d 1209, 1212.
107. Varig, 692 F.2d at 1206.
108. Id. at 1208.
109. Id. at 1206.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1207.
112. Id. (citing S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v.
Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982)).
113. Varig, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2758-59.
114. Id. at 2759.
115. Vanig, 692 F.2d 1205.
116. Id. at 1207-08; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323 AND 324A,
supra note 50.
117. 692 F.2d at 1208-09.
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compared the FAA inspector's investigation responsibilities to the
lighthouse inspector in Indian Towing, and found them to be
similar.18
The United Scottish case involved the crash of a DeHavilland
Dove aircraft on October 8, 1968.119 The aircraft was owned and
operated by plaintiff, John Dowdle. 120 Shortly after taking off from
Las Vegas, Nevada, the aircraft caught fire, crashed and burned,
killing all four people on board.121
The aircraft was originally manufactured in the United Kingdom
in 1951 and later purchased by Air Wisconsin in the United
States.1 22 In 1965, Air Wisconsin contracted with Aerodyne Engineering Corporation for the installation of a gasoline-burning cabin

heater.123 Pursuant to FAA regulations, 124 Aerodyne received authority for the installation and, upon inspection of the completed

heater system by an FAA inspector, received a supplemental type
125
certificate for the airplane as modified.
An actual inspection of the installation by an FAA inspector was

mandatory for certification in that the only previous specifications
provided to the FAA were polaroid pictures taken of the "completed installation." 12 6 The trial court found that the heater, as installed, exhibited numerous design deficiencies, which should have

alerted any reasonably competent FAA or General Aviation Dis-

trict Office 12 7 inspector to the fact that the overall quality of the

design and fabrication of the heater system was not consistent with

FAA regulations.1 28 The trial court also found that the accident
would not have occurred if a non-negligent, proper inspection had

118. Id. at 1209; see also supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
119. Varig, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2759.
120. Id. at 2759. The plaintiffs who brought this action were: United Scottish Insurance Co. (insurance carrier seeking indemnification); John W. Dowdle (owner and
operator of the plane); Kathryn Felming, Maxine Clearly and Simone Weaver (survivors of three of the four crash victims).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 14 C.F.R. 21.113 (1985). See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
125. Findings of Fact at 3, nos. 5-7, United Scottish, No.71-36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30,
1975) (Findings of Fact on file in the offices of the California Western Law Review).
See also Joint Appendix at 206-07, Varig, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Jt.
App.] (Jt. App. on file in the offices of the California Western Law Review). See generally infra note 162 and accompanying text.
126. Jt. App., supra note 125, at 281-83. Deposition of Charles H. McMillan, Assistant Chief, Engineering-Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Ft. Worth, Texas. Mr. McMillan signed the supplemental type certificate for the Dove after modification.
127. General Aviation District Office; FAA employees located at airport offices
throughout the country.
128. Findings of Fact at 6, no. 21, United Scottish, No. 71-36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30,
1975); see also Jt. App., supra note 125, at 209.
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been made. 12 9 Therefore, the trial court found the negligence of the
FAA inspector was a proximate cause of the inflight fire and result130
ing crash.
The United States appealed and the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case for a decision concerning whether the evidence was sufficient
13 1
to support a finding of liability under the Good Samaritan Rule.
In the second trial, the district court found the government "liable
to the plaintiffs for the physical harm they sustained as a result of
the government's failure to exercise reasonable care in performance
of inspection and certification of the aircraft."' 132 "This liability
[was] based on the finding that plaintiffs relied upon the govern33
ment's undertaking and suffered harm thereby."'
The United States again appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's finding of reliance under
California's Good Samaritan rule.134 Further, in an apparent application of the operational level test, the Ninth Circuit held that:
F.A.A. officials enforce the [safety] requirements by inspecting
aircraft, but [the inspector] cannot in any way change or waive
safety requirements. Because no room for policy judgment or
decision exists, a discretionary function is not being performed,
and the trial court correctly refused to 1protect
the government
35
under the discretionary function clause.
C. Treatment of Varig and United Scottish
by the Supreme Court
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and held that liability for the negligence of the FAA
in certifying aircraft for use in commercial aviation is barred by the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA.136 Chief Justice
Burger, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court, first reviewed
the brief legislative history and the confused judicial interpretations
of the discretionary function exception.' 3 7 Admitting that the
Supreme Court's reading of the FTCA had not followed a straight
129. Findings of Fact at 7, no. 27, United Scottish, No. 71-36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30,
1975); see also Jt. App., supra note 125, at 210.
130. Findings of Fact at 7, no. 28, United Scottish, No. 71-36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30,
1975); see also Jt. App., supra note 125, at 210.
131. United Scottish, 614 F.2d 188, 198-99.
132. Memorandum Decision at 9, United Scottish, No. 71-36-E (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum Decision] (Memorandum Decision on file in
the offices of the California Western Law Review). See also 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1979).
133. Memorandum Decision, supra note 132, at 29.
134. United Scottish, 692 F.2d 1209, 1211 (1982).
135. Id. at 1212.
136. Varig, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2769.
137. Id. at 2762-65.
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line, the Court resurrected Dalehite and its almost blanket application of the discretionary function exception. 138 While the Court did
not mention or repudiate the planning level/operational level test,
the Court did distinguish previous cases that had found governmental liability under the FTCA. 139 In particular, the Indian Towing
case, which had been used as a guide in interpreting the planning
level/operational level test, was distinguished by the Court as never
having dealt with the discretionary function exception in that the
government conceded that it involved operational level activity. ,
The Court determined that there are several factors useful in determining when the acts of a government employee are protected by
the discretionary exception:
First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception
applies in a given case... . Thus, the basic inquiry . . . is
whether the challenged acts of a Government employeewhatever his or her rank-are of the nature and quality that
Congress intended to shield from tort liability.
Second, whatever else the discretionary function exception
may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting
in its role as a regulator of the
141
conduct of private individuals.
The Court's primary consideration was whether the discretionary
function exception immunized from tort liability the FAA certification process "involved in this case." 1 42 The respondents' argument
was summarized by the Court as "the negligentfailure of the FAA
to inspect certain aspects of aircraft type design in the process of
certification gives rise to a cause of action against the United States
under the Act."1 43 The Court summarized the government's view
of the FAA as that of a regulatory agency whose function is
"merely to police the conduct of private individuals by monitoring
their compliance with FAA regulations." 144 This regulatory activity, the government argued, is designed to encourage compliance
with minimum safety requirements and, as such, is the sort of conduct protected by the discretionary function exception.1 45
After reviewing the technical and administrative requirements of
type certification, the Court found that the "FAA's implementation
of a [spot-check] mechanism for compliance review is plainly dis138. Id. at 2764-69.
139. Id. at 2764.
140. Id. "Significantly, the Government conceded that the discretionary function
exception was not implicated in Indian Towing...
" Id.
141. Id. at 2765.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2766 (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2766.
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cretionary activity of the 'nature14and
quality' protected by [the dis6
cretionary function exception]."
The Court noted that the respondents' contention that the FAA
was negligent in failing to inspect certain elements of the aircraft's
14 7
design, challenged two aspects of the certification procedure.
The first aspect challenged was the decision by the FAA to implement a spot-check for compliance review, and the second was the
application of the spot-check inspection to the particular aircraft in
48
Varig and United Scottish.'
In the Court's view, both claims are barred by the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA because "[w]hen an agency determines the extent to which it will supervise the safety procedures of
private individuals, it is exercising discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic kind." 149 Further, the Court noted:
In administering the "spot-check" program, these FAA engineers and inspectors necessarily took certain calculated risks, but
those risks were encountered for the advancement of a governmental purpose and pursuant to the specific grant of authority in
the regulations and operating manuals. Under such circumstances, the FAA's alleged negligence in failing to check certain
specific items in the course of certificating a particular aircraft
falls squarely
within the discretionary function exception of
150
§ 2680(a).
Additionally, the Court held that "the acts of FAA employees in
executing the 'spot-check' program in accordance with agency directives are protected by the discretionary function exception as
15 1
well."
The Court viewed the implementation of a "spot checking" program to ensure manufacturers' compliance with safety standards as
the best way to accomplish the goal of safe air transportation and to
deal with the realities of limited FAA personnel and resources.' 5 2
The Court emphasized that protection of regulatory activities was
the underlying reason for the enactment of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA in that "Congress wished to prevent
judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the me53
dium of an action in tort."'
146. Id. at 2768. See supra note 99.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2768-69.

151. Id. at 2768.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2765. See also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27.
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In reviewing the judgments of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court held that:
In rendering the United States amenable to some suits in tort,
Congress could not have intended to impose liability for the regulatory enforcement activities of the FAA challenged in this
case. The FAA has a statutory duty to promote safety in air
transportation, not to insure it. We hold that these actions
against the FAA for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft
for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary
function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 154
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

Like Moses descending from the mountain top with the Ten
Commandments, the government now descends upon the courts
and plaintiffs' counsel saying "dismiss and sue no more," for this
15 5
case ends forever a cause of action for negligent certification.
"Those who assert otherwise fail to understand the clear message of
156
the Supreme Court in Varig."'
However, the message is not quite so clear. The Court's opinion
either ignored or overlooked the facts of the United Scottish case.
The Supreme Court noted:
From the records in these cases there is no indication that either
the Boeing 707 trash receptacle or the DeHavilland Dove cabin
heater was actually inspected or reviewed by an FAA inspector
or representative .... Respondents thus argue in effect that the
negligent failure of the FAA to
inspect. . . gives rise to a cause
15 7
of action. . . under the Act.
The Court cites as authority for this position the briefs of the
United States and Varig Airlines. However, only in Varig was there
an issue of "failure to inspect." The issue in United Scottish was
negligent inspection, not failure to inspect. The government's brief
failed to mention the specific finding of fact by the United Scottish
trial court that an actual inspection was negligently done.158
Specifically, the trial court in United Scottish found, as a matter
offact, that an inspection of the modification was required by the
FAA's regulations,1 59 that the modification was inspected and that
154. Varig, 105 S.Ct. 2769.
155. See Dombroff, Varig, United Scottish and DalehiteRevisited, AviA. Lrr. RrR.
1,804, 1,808 (July 2, 1984). (Mr. Dombroff is the former Director, Torts Branch, Civil
Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The actual quote is: "Vaig lays to rest the regulatory inspection and certification activities of the United States as a basis for tort liability." Id.).
156. Id. at 1,808-09.
157. Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2766 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 2766. See also Petition for Rehearing, supra note 10, at 4.
159. Findings of Fact at 3, no. 7, United Scottish, No. 71-36-E (S.D. Cal. July 30,
1975); see also Jt. App., supra note 125, at 207.
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the inspection was negligently perforned. 16 The Ninth Circuit
noted that "[t]he parties agree that FAA regulations also required
its approval for
that the FAA inspect the installation prior to giving
' 161
issuance of the [supplemental type certificate]."
The Supreme Court had all this information in the record before
it,162 and the finding of an actual inspection was pointed out to the
Court in oral argument.1 63 Yet, the opinion makes no mention of
the issue of liability when an inspection is mandated, negligently
performed, and results in a tragic accident.
In addition to the failure of the government to include the findings of fact in its brief,164 part of the reason for the Court's misinterpretation may be found in the oral argument by Kenneth S. Geller,
Esq., on behalf of the Solicitor General of the United States. Mr.
Geller stated, "[t]here was no proof in this case, nor could there be
in any of these cases that a particular FAA inspector went in,
looked at a particular aircraft and determined that it was all right
whereas the safety standards show it was not."1 65
Mr. Richard F. Gerry, Esq., attorney for respondent, United
Scottish, accurately summarized the Court's mistake in his petition
for rehearing:
Thus, the Court is incorrect when it states in its discussion of
the Supplemental Type Certificate requirements that:
"The methods used by FAA employees or their
representatives to determine an applicant's compliance with minimum safety standards are generally
the same as those implied for basic type certification." United States v. Varig Airlines, supra at
4835.
As clearly shown by the record and found by the District
Court, the methods used by the FAA in the single aircraft Supplemental Type Certificate are very different from those used in
the certification of new types of aircraft.
The reasoning of the Court in its June 19th opinion is based
upon the alleged failure of FAA employees to inspect aircraft
pursuant to a "spot-check" program which left those employees
with discretion to determine whether or not to inspect. Such rea160. Findings of Fact at 7, no. 28, United Scottish, No. 71-36-E (S.D.Cal. July 30,
1975); see also Jt. App., supra note 125, at 210.
161. United Scottish, 614 F.2d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1979).
162. The Joint Appendix referred to supra notes 125-26, 128-30, and 159-60, contained for the Court the district court findings of fact, the depositions of all pertinent
witnesses and the lower court's decision. All clearly show that an inspection was required and negligently performed.
163. Transcript of Oral Argument before the United States Supreme Court at 29,
Varig, supra note 1, 104 S. Ct. 2755 [hereinafter cited as Oral Argument] (Oral Argument on file in the offices of California Western Law Review).
164. See supra note 158.
165. Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 46.
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soning cannot logically be applied to the facts of United Scottish
where the employees were not imbued with such discretion but
instead were required to inspect, did inspect and negligently inspected66the installation of the heater in the DeHavilland
Dove.'
The government contends that as a result of the Varig decision a
cause of action no longer exists for negligent inspection.167 However, a careful reading of the opinion and the facts of the United
Scottish case shows that the only issue resolved by the Supreme
Court was that the government and its employees are not liable for
a failure to inspect. 16 8 The issue of liability, when the regulations
require an actual physical inspection and that inspection is negligently performed, remains unresolved.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE
APPLICATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION

EXCEPTION AFrER VARIG

After Varig, the clear focus of a district court's analysis should be
a factual determination of whether the challenged acts or omission
bring into judicial review policymaking decisions of a regulatory
agency-regardless of the rank or status of the individual actors.
The Supreme Court accurately stated, "it is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception."' 169 Because a precise definition is
"impossible," each case "requires a factual analysis of the circum17 0
stances and the government policy involved."
The facts and circumstances of each case should be considered by
the district court as they relate to each of the following questions:
1. To what extent does the act or omission directly affect the
feasibility 17and practicability of the government's regulatory
program? '
2. Does the act or omission 172
require the exercise of political,
social or economic judgement?
3. Does the act or omission require evaluation
of the need to
173
maximize compliance with agency regulations?
4. Does the act or omission require consideration of the efficient allocation of agency resources? 174

5. Does the act or omission require a decision to take or not to
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Petition for Rehearing, supra note 10, at 10.
Dombroff, supra note 155, at 1,808-09.
Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2769.
Id. at 2765 (emphasis added).
In re All Asbestos Cases, 603 F. Supp. 599, 611 (D. Hawaii, 1984).
Varig, 104 S. Ct. 2768.
Id. at 2765.
Id. at 2768.

174. Id.
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take certain calculated
risks for the advancement of a govern175
ment purpose?
6. Did the decision involve a determination made by an executive or administrator in176establishing plans, specifications or
schedules of operations?
7. Would judicial evaluation of the act or omission impair the
177
effective administration of government?
8. Does the act or omission require the actor to establish priorities for the accomplishment of policy objectives by balancing
the objective sought to be obtained
against practical considera178
tion such as staffing and funding?
9. Does the act or omission require a judgment regarding the
degree of confidence that
might reasonably be placed in the per17 9
sons being regulated?
10. Was the act or omission one of a subordinate in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance with official specific directions?' 80
No one question should be controlling in determining whether a
discretionary function exception applies. The above questions and
the facts that answer each question should be weighed and balanced
in relation to each other. The district courts should value each answer with regard to the particular case. The analysis and balancing
of the answers to the above questions is not new to the district
courts in that it is the same analysis and balancing used in determining negligence.' 8 '
Since this approach will require the scrutiny of facts peculiar to
each case, the determination should only be done after full discovery has been allowed. The district courts should then rule asfinders
of fact that the acts or omissions are or are not within the discretionary function exception.
The determination by the district court of whether the challenged
acts involved a regulatory agency's policymaking discretion should
be reversed on appeal only if clearly erroneous. For, although the
standard of review for questions involving the discretionary function exception has not been addressed in the appellate courts, the
factual determinations necessary in a regulatory policymaking inquiry are analogous to the factual determination of diversity jurisdiction 8 2 and discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 2764. See also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36.
Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765.
Id. at 2768.
Id.
Id.
For example, see W. PROSSER &xW. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 235-38
(5TH ED. 1984).
182. See Scoggins v. Pollock, 727 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1984) (district court's finding
of domicile for purpose of diversity jurisdiction, will not be disturbed unless clearly
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Rights Act; 8 3 both of which are reversible only if clearly erroneous.

This standard of review is logical and necessary if the appellate
courts are ever going to establish a body of precedent that the legal
community can rely on for guidance. A review of several cases decided since Varig highlights the need for a consistent approach.184
erroneous); Combee v. Shell Oil Co., 615 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1980) (district court's finding that plaintiff was a Florida domiciliary for diversity purposes was not clearly
erroneous).
183. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (Inquiry as to whether the
differential impact of a seniority system reflects an intent to discriminate is a pure question of fact, subject to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 clearly-erroneous standard. The rule broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
184. See Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985) (safe radioactive
exposure levels for miners set by government later found to cause cancer were discretionary and, therefore, excepted from liability by § 2680(a). The court held that it was
inappropriate to limit the application of the discretionary function exception to regulatory activities and that, even in respect to nonregulatory activities, the exception will be
applied when a government employee or agent exercises judgment of what the best
course of action was under the existing circumstances.); Gillis v. United States Dept. of
Health & Human Serv., 759 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1985) (the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services monitors as well as enforces compliance with regulations falls squarely within the agency's exercise of discretion); Hylin v. United States,
755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (Under Vaig, where the Mine Enforcement and Safety
Administration inspector has the discretion to fix a reasonable time for abatement and,
in some cases, to choose between two means by which the mine operator can abate the
violation, the activities are protected by the discretionary function exception); Feyers v.
United States, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2655 (May 28,
1985) (decision to delegate safety responsibility to employer safety programs and to not
institute a safety training program were the type of discretionary functions excepted);
Spencer v. New Orleans Levee Bd., 737 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1984) (federal officials enjoy
absolute immunity from civil suit for the discretionary actions taken in the course of
their employment); Jet Indus., Inc. v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Tex. 1984)
(selection and supervision of participants in federal witness protection program constitute discretionary functions which are excepted from governmental tort liability); Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984) (federal
agency's performance of its statutory mandatory duties to regulate and examine member associations when not in excess of its regulatory role fall within the discretionary
function exception); Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984)
(United States decisions to engage in use of radioactive aircraft instrument dials were
discretionary and its failure to label the dials, which it subsequently supplied, even if
actionable, was immune under the discretionary function exception); Aronson v. United
States, 595 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 1985)
(Justice Department determination of who to name in a civil suit is discretionary and,
therefore, shielded from tort liability if defendant named in error).
But see In re All Asbestos Cases, 603 F. Supp. 599 (D. Hawaii 1984) (determinating
whether conduct of the government falls within the discretionary function exception
requires a factual analysis of the circumstances and the government policy involved);
Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984) (discretionary function defense to tort claim does not permit government, under guise of policymaking, to negligently remove its proffered safety net without reasonable notice to those who risk their
lives daily in reliance on it).
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1985]

VI.

SUBSEQUENT CASES

In McMichael v. United States,18 5 plaintiffs sued the United

States for the negligence of Defense Department inspectors in failing to enforce compliance with the safety requirements set forth in
the Defense Department's manual. 186 The court of appeals rejected
the government's discretionary function defense and held that the
"Defense Department inspectors were not called upon to make discretionary regulatory judgments. Rather, they had a number of
precise inspections to perform
which involved no judgment con18 7
cerning agency policy.1

Similarly, in National Carriers,Inc. v. United States,18 8 the court

of appeals upheld the district court's finding that a federal meat
inspector had a duty to condemn or identify beef exposed to ditch
water.18 9 Citing McMichael, the court of appeals distinguished between "discretionary judgments concerning agency policy and nondiscretionary responsibilities to carry out federal regulations." 190
The court held that failure to condemn or identify the contaminated
beef cannot be considered a protected discretionary act. 191
In Andrulonis v. United States,192 the government was sued for

the negligent conduct of a government research doctor in the production and introduction of a rabies vaccine.1 93 The court held that
the case presented "issues of negligence in the exercise of professional and scientific judgment rather than policymaking and a concomitant balancing of competing considerations in determining the
public interest."1 94 Additionally, the court noted that "[t]he fact
that an individual actor employed by the federal government exercises some judgment in the carryingout of his responsibilitiescannot
be determinitive, or the discretionaryfunction exception would swallow the general rule permitting tort suit against the government."195
Contrary to these opinions, in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United

States,196 plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was negligent in issuing
and monitoring certificates authorizing modifications to a certain
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 307.
755 F.2d at 675 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 677.
Id. at 678.

191. Id.
192.
193.
194.
195.

593 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1339.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1232 (2d

Cir. 1982); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1974)).
196. 742 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984).
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type of jet aircraft, which later turned out to be defective.1 97 In
finding the decision of the Supreme Court in Varig wholly applicable, the court held that "[a]ppellants' challenge to the FAA's execution of its responsibility by failing to discover the defects sooner and
is barred by the
failing to adequately monitor the19[modifications]
8
discretionary function exception."
The most significant result of the Varig decision and its effect on
liability for regulatory agencies is found in General Public Utilities
Corp. v. United States.199 The plaintiffs' complaint asserted a cause
of action under the FTCA alleging the Nuclear Regulatory Commission failed to warn them of equipment defects at the Three Mile
Island nuclear facility. 2 °° In dismissing plaintiffs' complaint seeking more than four billion dollars in damages, the court of appeals
reviewed the Varig decision and concluded, "[t]here is no substantial distinction between the choice made by the FAA as to its
method of inspection and decisions made by the Nuclear Regula."201 Admittedly, the court noted, that while
tory Commission ..
"in hindsight the Commission's judgment may have been in-advised
[this] in no way changes the character of the function under scrutiny."' 20 2 "Regulatory activities are within the exception, not beof
cause alternatives exist in particular circumstances, but because
20°3
the fundamental character of the role assigned to the agency.
Perhaps the most novel and expansive interpretation of the Varig
decision is found in Flammia v. United States.2°4 In Flammia, a
police officer brought an action against the United States for injuries received when he was shot by a Cuban refugee who was admitted into this country by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
[hereinafter referred to as INS]. 20 5 The Cuban refugee had advised
INS of his robbery conviction and imprisonment in Cuba. 0 6 The
plaintiff alleged that the INS was negligent in releasing the refugee
without proper supervision and without proper notification of local
law enforcement authorities.2 0 7 The Sixth Circuit, quoting from
Varig, determined that the INS acted in its role as a " 'regulator of
the conduct of private individuals'" 208and, as such, was excepted
from tort liability by section 2680(a).
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 504-05.
745 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 U.S. 1227 (Feb. 19, 1985).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245.
Id.
739 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 205 (quoting Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765).
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These cases highlight that a distinction can be made between a
failure to inspect and a negligent inspection. When such a distinction is made, and the courts correctly perceive that distinction, then
a correct following of Varig allows the courts to hold the government liable for a negligent inspection.
CONCLUSION

While the meaning of the Varig opinion is fairly clear regarding
policy decisions, there is a difference of opinion in interpreting the
extent of its meaning. Under a broad interpretation of the decision,
which the government espouses, the United States is not liable for
any negligence of its agencies in carrying out a regulatory function.
However, if that is what the Supreme Court wished to say, a one
sentence or paragraph referral to the fact that an actual inspection
had been negligently performed in the United Scottish case would
have easily done what the government is now going to have to labor
to do. Plaintiffs' attorneys will have to be careful to distinguish
their cases from the Varig case and clearly point out to the courts
that an actual negligent inspection was never addressed in the opinion. Those cases that have held for plaintiffs since the Varig decision have all focused on a required inspection that was negligently
performed. 20 9 Plaintiffs' counsel should use these cases to support
this distinction of the Varig holding. Carefully establishing from
the beginning of a case that the activity did not involve governmental policy, but rather the activity involved was mandated by regulations and negligently performed by the individual employee or
agent of the regulatory agency, appears to be the best possible avenue to a successful suit under the FTCA where the discretionary
function exception might be applicable.
Additionally, the courts should follow the approach suggested in
this Note in order to establish a consistent body of precedent that
attorneys can rely upon. Otherwise, new meaning will be given to
Justice Jackson's comment in his dissent in Dalehite: "Surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace more than traffic accidents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that 'The King
can do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has merely been
amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs.' "210
Thomas H. (Speedy) Rice

209. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
210. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 60.
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